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1 Introduction
Micronance continues to play a key role in approaches to poverty alleviation around the world, both
in policy and academic discussions and in practice. Yet despite the attention paid to micronance,
some aspects of the design of credit contracts for small uncollateralized loans remains a bit of a
mystery. Much early academic work focused on joint liability small groups of borrowers being
held jointly liable for one anothers repayments as the key to high loan recovery rates (see, for
example, Stiglitz (1990);Varian (1990); and Ghatak (1999)). But while joint liability remains a
feature in the majority of micronance loan contracts, it is no longer the sole focus. Several factors
have contributed to this change. A number of large micro-lenders have expanded into or converted
their portfolios to individual liability loans, although the evidence on the e¤ects of these changes
remains inconclusive.1 At the same time, there has been a growing recognition of the potential
costs of joint liability (Banerjee, Besley, and Guinnane (1994); Besley and Coate (1995); Fischer
(2010)). Attention is turning to other features of micronance contracts.
This paper analyzes the theoretical underpinnings of a largely overlooked feature in nearly all
micronance contracts: high-frequency repayment.2 The typical loan contract requires repayment
in small, frequent installments beginning immediately after origination. Most lending contracts
require weekly repayment, and there is a pervasive sense among practitioners that frequent repay-
ment is critical to achieving high repayment rates. This belief is captured well in the following
observation by Muhammad Yunus:
[I]t is hard to take a huge wad of bills out of ones pocket and pay the lender.
There is enormous temptation from ones family to use that money to meet immediate
consumption needs...Borrowers nd this incremental process easier than having to ac-
cumulate money to pay a lump sum because their lives are always under strain, always
di¢ cult.Muhammad Yunus, Banker to the Poor, p. 114.
1Between 2001 and 2002, Grameen converted all of its branches to Grameen II, which eliminates the group fund
and eliminates explicit joint liability (Yunus 2010); BancoSol moved the majority of its borrowers from group to
individual contracts (BancoSol 2010); and ASA in Bangladesh has relaxed or eliminated joint liability(Armendariz
and Morduch 2005). Giné and Karlan (2009) conduct two randomized control trials with Green Bank in the
Philippines testing repayment behavior under group versus individual liability loans, nding no increase in default
rates with the elimination or random assignment away from group liability.
2Jain and Mansuri (2003), which we discuss later in this section, is an exception.
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Yet the perceived importance of frequent repayment is theoretically puzzling. Classically ratio-
nal individuals should benet from more exible repayment schedules, and less frequent repayment
should increase neither default nor delinquency.
Empirical evidence on the e¤ect of repayment frequency is both limited and mixed. BRAC, one
of the largest MFIs with nearly six million clients, abandoned a move to biweekly repayment when
an experiment showed increased delinquencies (Armendariz and Morduch 2005). Satin Credit
Care, an urban MFI targeting trading enterprises, saw delinquencies increase from less than 1%
to nearly 50% when it tested a move from daily to weekly repayment.3 In Bolivia, BancoSol has
revised its repayment policy repeatedly in response to uctuating arrears (Gonzalez-Vega, Navajas,
and Schreiner (1995); Westley (2004)).
Recently, the importance of this issue has attracted experimental and quasi-experimental in-
vestigation. McIntosh (2008) uses spatial variation in loan administration by FINCA Uganda to
show that when groups of clients were allowed to select biweekly loan payment, group dropouts
fell and repayment performance was actually slightly improved. However, as McIntosh notes, this
tests the e¤ects of allowing existing clients to decide from a menu of contract options and not the
direct e¤ect of changing repayment terms. Field and Pande (2008) conduct just such a test using
the random assignment of clients to either weekly or monthly repayment schedules. They nd no
signicant e¤ect on delinquencies, with all treatment groups reporting extremely low default and
delinquency rates. Nonetheless, micronance practitioners share an almost universal belief that
frequent repayment schedules improve repayment rates.
This paper proposes a simple theory based on present-biased, quasi-hyperbolic preferences in
order to capture the intuition in Yunuss quote and the belief of many micronance practitioners
that clients benet from the scal discipline required by a frequent repayment schedule. The model
is stark in order to highlight one particular e¤ect: if borrowers are present-biased (-impatient),
frequent repayment can increase the maximum loan size for which repayment is incentive compat-
ible. Intuitively, when borrowers are present biased, the immediate gain to defaulting on any large
repayment is subject to signicant temptation. When these payments are spread out, the instan-
taneous repayment burden at any time is smaller and thus less subject to temptation. However,
3Greg Fischer interview with H.P. Singh, November 2005.
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frequent repayment also means that at the time of the rst payment, which is when the incentive
constraint is tightest, the rewards (typically access to future credit) are further away from the
repayment decision and thus more heavily discounted. This is the core trade-o¤ highlighted by our
analysis.
The result is not simply a case of frequentrepayment generically relaxing incentive compatibility
constraints. We show that for classically rational discounters, the timing of payments should not
a¤ect willingness to repay. Yet for present-biased borrowers, the repayment structure matters.
Their present bias makes it harder to support repayment with the promise of future rewards for
any loan structure they support a smaller maximum loan size than classically rational individuals.
But, smaller, more frequent repayments can increase the maximum loan size they are willing to
repay.
While our basic model does not allow borrowers access to a savings technology, we extend our
model to allow for savings and show that our results go through. Indeed, for classical discounters
with access to savings, frequent repayment has no added benets, since borrowers can replicate
via their own savings behavior any frequent repayment structure that the lender might want to
implement.
Yet frequent repayment in not unambiguously good for repayment performance. It increases
transaction costs incurred by both borrowers and lenders. This includes direct costs to the lender
as well as the opportunity cost of meeting attendance, both of which can be substantial. Activity
based costing exercises suggest that weekly collection meetings account for as much as one-third of
direct operating expenses (Shankar (2006), Karduck and Seibel (2004)). Womens World Banking
(2003) found that meeting frequency was a factor in the drop-out decision of 28% of their clients in
Bangladesh and 11% in Uganda. We therefore extend the basic model to incorporate per meeting
transaction costs. These costs serve as a balancing force against the improved incentives of frequent
repayment.
This paper examines one possible mechanism through which frequent repayment can increase the
maximum incentive compatible loan size and perhaps account for the low default rates realized by
MFIs. Apart from the current paper, Jain and Mansuri (2003) consider an alternative explanation
for high-frequency repayment. They argue that tight repayment schedules force MFI clients to
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borrow from informal lenders in order to make their regular payments, thus allowing the MFI to
utilize the superior monitoring capability of informal lenders. While this mechanism may be in
place in some settings, we provide a more parsimonious framework focusing on borrower behavior,
keeping the lending side of the story very simple. We are aware of no other attempts to formalize
frequent repayment, and this paper strives to capture the scal discipline argument frequently
put forth by practitioners.
Recent theoretical work on the borrowing and savings behavior of time-inconsistent borrowers
is also related to our paper. Basu (2009) uses quasi-hyperbolic preferences to characterize when
commitment savings products will be o¤ered and, when o¤ered, how they will a¤ect consumer
welfare. A related paper (Basu 2008) shows that sophisticated, time-inconsistent agents, rationally
choose to save their wealth and then borrow if necessary to fund future investment opportunities.
The combination of savings and a loan generates incentives for their future selves to invest optimally
by punishing over-consumption. Another related paper is Heidhues and Köszegi (2009) who analyze
contract choices, loan-repayment behavior and welfare in a competitive credit market setting when
borrowers are present-biased. Our work complements these papers by focusing on a di¤erent issue:
the e¤ect of frequent loan repayment on incentives to repay, as well as welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the
basic model and solve for the maximum incentive compatible loan size for contracts of di¤erent
repayment frequency. Section 3 extend the model to include transaction costs and savings. Section
4 concludes.
2 The Model
We take a simple model of a credit market with ex post moral hazard. In period 0, a single,
risk-neutral agent borrows an amount L from a prot-maximizing lender at a gross, per-period
interest rate R that is determined exogenously. In periods 1 and 2, the agent receives a certain
income w and decides whether or not to make repayments under the terms of the loan contract.
In period 3, the agent receives a net continuation value of V , can be thought of as the utility value
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of continued access to credit4 or avoiding other forms of punishment, if she has met the repayment
terms and 0 otherwise. With risk neutrality, the agents instantaneous utility is simply her current
period consumption, ct. We model present-bias with quasi-hyperbolic discounting such that in any
period t, her future lifetime utility is:
U t = ut + 
TX
=t+1
 tu ,
where  2 (0; 1] and  2 (0; 1). Note that for  = 1 these preferences collapse to standard, time-
consistent utility. We assume the agent is sophisticated; she knows that her future selves discount
the future exactly as she does.
We consider two possible credit contracts: single and two-period repayment. The former re-
quires a single repayment of M1  LR2 in the second period. The latter requires two equal
payments of M2  LR2=(R+ 1) in each period.
To focus attention on the relationship between present bias and repayment frequency, we assume
that the loan is used for consumption and does not a¤ect income. We also assume that w  LR2,
such that savings is not required to make the required repayment for either type loan.
Using this framework, we solve for the maximum loan size for which repayment is incentive
compatible, Ln, where n 2 f1; 2g indicates the number of repayment periods, taking R as given.
Alternatively, we could take the loan size as given and solve for the maximum incentive compatible
interest rate, but this would not change the thrust of the results.
2.1 Solution to the basic model
In any period, the agent only repays if doing so maximizes her expected future lifetime utility.
For the single period repayment, there is a single incentive compatibility constraint in the second
period that determines the repayment decision. The agent will repay if and only if:
w  M1 + V  w. (1)
4Micronance institutions typically punish default by denying future credit in perpetuity. This form of punishment
maps naturally to the model in which the continuation value is realized a xed interval after the initial borrowing.
Section 3.1 considers the alternative possiblity of punishment being enforced a xed interval after any default.
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Incentive compatible repayment therefore requires
L  V
R2
 L1. (2)
Now we consider the repayment decision for the two-period loan proceeding by backwards
induction. The second period incentive compatibility constraint is similar to (1). The agent will
repay if and only if:
w  M2 + V  w: (3)
This requires
L  (R+ 1)V
R2
: (4)
Unsurprisingly, for any loan size, the repayment incentive compatibility constraint in the second
period is less restrictive when the payments are spread out. Regardless of the agents degree of
present bias, there is less immediate gain to non-payment.
Turning to the repayment decision in the rst period, the rst period incentive compatibility
constraint requires
w  M2 + (w  M2) + 2V  w + w,
which implies
L  (R+ 1)
2
R2(1 + )
V  L2: (5)
Note that the agent will only repay in the rst period if she does not plan to default in the second.
However, the rst period incentive compatibility constraint is strictly less than that in Period 2,
and we can focus on the decision utility in Period 1.
We can now compare (2) and (5), the maximum incentive compatible loan sizes for one- and
two-repayment period loans. The condition for two repayment periods to support a larger loan
size is:
L2 > L1 ,  < (R+ 1)  1

: (6)
When the interest rate equals the discount rate, R = 1, this condition holds for all present-biased
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borrowers. More frequent repayment repayment supports a larger incentive-compatible maximum
loan size. The intuition is as follows: With one-shot repayment, only the second periods decision
counts, and in this period there is a large immediate gain to non-payment that is subject to
temptation. With frequent repayments, the rst-period decision matters. Splitting payments
moves the reward, V , further away from the initial repayment decision, but some of the repayment
burden is also borne by the borrowers future self. This in turn relaxes the incentive compatibility
constraint. In the second period, the instantaneous repayment burden is smaller and thus less
subject to temptation. While more tempted (-impatient) borrowers can support a lower maximum
loan size than time-consistent borrowers (@Ln=@ > 1), the incentive compatibility constraint is
less restrictive when (6) holds.
2.2 Traditional Micronance Loans
In this section we consider the traditional, non-amortizing micronance loan. In most such loans,
a at interest expenses is calculated at loan origination and the gross amount, principal, fees, and
interest, is repaid in equal installments over the tenor of the loan.5 In line with this procedure,
many micronance institutions do not change the total interest expense when changing repayment
frequency. We can incorporate this in the basic model by capitalizing total interest expense into
L and setting R equal to 1.
In this setting, the relative loan size constraint becomes
L2 > L1 ,  < 2  1

.
We state this as:
Proposition 1 The maximum incentive compatible loan size is greater under more frequent repay-
ments for present-biased borrowers if and only if  < 2  1 .
Let the condition  < 2   1 , or, equivalently,  > 12  be referred to as Condition 1. For
time-consistent agents ( = 1), L2 < L1 8  < 1, that is for classical discounters, the maximum
5Thus, for example, a 52-week loan of Rs. 1000 at an 18% interest rate would be repaid in equal installments of
Rs. 22.69 (1000 18% 52), representing an e¤ective annual interest rate of 39.6%.
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incentive compatible loan size is smaller when payments are split. However, for borrowers that
are su¢ ciently present-biased (low ) and not too impatient (  12), the maximum incentive
compatible loan size is greater under more frequent repayments.
2.3 Savings
In this subsection, we introduce savings to the basic model. First, we consider savings under the
maintained assumption that w  LR2, that is, that savings is not required to repay either loan.
The economic environment is as above with one di¤erence: in each of the rst two periods, the
borrower can save at periodic gross rate of . Due to the linearity of preferences, the result is
immediate. Individuals will save for consumption in the subsequent period if and only if  > 1.
Because borrowers are sophisticated, they solve for the optimal consumption path by backwards
induction, recognizing the present bias of their future selves and this is also the condition for savings
in any period.6 Unless required as security for loan repayment, accrued savings does not enter into
the repayment incentive compatibility constraint.
Observation When w  LR2 allowing savings has no e¤ect on either L1 or L2.
2.4 Welfare
The appropriate means to evaluate welfare under time-inconsistent preferences remains an open
question. By construction, an agents preferences at di¤erent times disagree with one another.
Focusing on the agents welfare in any particular period does so at the potential expense of the
agent in other periods. We thus follow the long-run perspective of Akerlof (1991) and ODonoghue
and Rabin (1999), and we consider the agents utility from a ctitious period 0 in which the agent
makes no decisions and weight utility as if she were time consistent.7
From this perspective, the lifetime welfare of the borrower under single-period repayment is
W 1 = L  2LR2 + 3V .
6This is not necessarily the case for naive borrowers. If  2 [ 1
22
; 1

] they would choose to save in period 0,
expecting to consume in period 2, and be unpleasantly surprisedwhen their period 1 self consumes the savings.
7For recent discussions of behavioral welfare economics, see Bernheim (2008), Bernheim and Rangel (2008), and
Koszegi and Rabin (2008).
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We evaluate this expression at L
1
= V
R2
and normalize V to 1 yielding
W 1 =

R2
+ (1  )3,
where the measure of present-bias, , reappears due to its e¤ect on the maximum incentive com-
patible loan size. Similarly, the lifetime utility of the borrower under two-period repayment is
W 2 = L  L R
2
R+ 1
  2L R
2
R+ 1
+ 3V ,
which we evaluate at L
2
= 
2(R+1)
R2(1+)
V , again normalizing V to 1:
W 2 =
2(1 +R)
(1 + )R2
  
3
(1 + )
  
4
(1 + )
+ 3.
Comparing welfare under the two repayment schedules, we nd that
W W 2  W 1 = 
R2
R  (1  )  
1 + 
  
4
1 + 
(1  ) .
Recall that
U1 = L  2LR2 + 3V .
Evaluating this at L
1
(and setting V = 1) yields:
U1 =

R2
  23 + 3.
Also,
U2 = L  L R
2
R+ 1
  2L R
2
R+ 1
+ 3V
Evaluating this at L
2
(and setting V = 1) yields:
U2 =
2(R+ 1)
R2(1 + )

1   R
2
R+ 1
  2 R
2
R+ 1

+ 3.
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Comparing the decision utility of the borrower under the two repayment schedules, we nd that
U  U2   U1 = 
R2
R  (1  )  
1 + 
  
24
1 + 
(1  ).
Observe that unless R  1 no one will lend. Similarly, when R > 1 even the present-biased
borrowers will not want to borrow.8 Therefore, we focus our attention on R in the interval
h
1; 1
i
:
Let
A(R)  
R2
R  (1  )  
1 + 
and
B  
4
1 + 
(1  ).
We can then write:
W = A(R) B
U = A(R)  B
Note that when Condition 1 holds, i.e., two-period repayment supports a larger maximum loan
size, A(1)  0. This implies that for  su¢ ciently close to 1 and hence B close to 0, the two-period
loan is preferred for both welfare and decision utility. Because   1, it also immediately follows
that if U < 0, or, B > A(R), then W < 0: That is, if the individual prefers the single-period
loan then it also produces higher welfare. Analogously, suppose W > 0, i.e., A(R) > B: In that
case, U > 0: That is, if the individuals welfare is lower with a single-period loan compared to a
two-period loan, then he will choose the two-period loan instead. The remaining possibility is the
most interesting one: suppose B > A(R) > B: Then the individual would choose a two-period
loan even though he would be better o¤ with a single-period loan. That is, he is over-borrowing.
It is straightforward to verify that A(1 ) = B. Also, A(
1
 ) = 
23(1 ) > B as the condition
simplies to 1 +  > , which is true: As A(R) is continuous, there exists R 2 [1; 1 ] such that
8Note that in the model as described, individuals may still want to borrow some minimal amount when R > 1
in order to capture the continuation value, V , even though borrowing reduces their utility in every period of the
loan. We do not focus on this behavior because we implicitly assume that V is a function of the surplus the borrower
receives from borrowing.
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B > A(R) > B:
Now we proceed to provide a tighter characterization. Notice that the sign of A0(R) depends
on the sign of 2(1    + )   R: Also, if it is negative for R = 1 , it is negative for R 2 [1 ; 1 ]:
The condition for this is 1 < 2  2, which is stronger than Assumption 1. Under this condition,
B > A(R) > B for all R 2 [1 ; 1 ]: However, as A(R) is decreasing under the assumption 1 < 2 2
and A(1 ) = B, it also follows that there exists
1
 > R^  1 such that A(R) > B for R 2 [R^; 1 ]:
If this assumption does not hold, and 12  <   12(1 ) then A(R) is increasing at R = 1 and
as it is strictly concave, there will be an interval [1 ; R
0] where R0  1 such that A(R)  B: In this
case, two-period loans will be chosen by the borrower and are welfare enhancing.
This result leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (1) If the single-period loan is preferred by the agent it is also the welfare maxi-
mizing contract, and conversely, if the individuals welfare is higher with a two-period loan, he will
prefer it. (2) If  > 12(1 ) then: (i) for all R 2 [1 ; 1 ] the agent prefers the loan in which repay-
ment is split into two periods; however, welfare is reduced relative to the single-period repayment
loan; (ii) there exists R0 2 1; 1  such that A(R)  B for R 2 [1; R0] two-period loans are welfare
enhancing and will be chosen by the borrower. (3) If 12  <   12(1 ) then there exists R00 2
[1 ;
1
 ] such that two period loans are welfare enhancing and will be chosen by the borrower.
Note that these welfare calculations do not rest on assumptions about whether or not the
borrower is naive or sophisticated about her self-control problems. Rather, the lender recognizes
the agents present bias and limits the maximum loan size accordingly. In a sense, the resulting
credit rationing protects the agent from herself, preventing large welfare losses that would occur if
a future self succumbed to temptation and defaulted unexpectedly.
We can also characterize welfare for a given loan size L, when this amount is independent of
the repayment structure. In this case W is easy to calculate and the following proposition is
immediate:
Proposition 3 For a given loan size L, a borrowers welfare is higher under the two-period loan
if and only if R > 1.
11
Intuitively, the borrower is trading o¤ the discounted value of consumption against the cost of
borrowing. When the cost of borrowing is relatively large, forgoing consumption to reduce the
balance on her debt improves her utility.
2.4.1 Welfare and the Use of Proceeds
The preceding welfare calculations implicitly assumed that loan proceeds were available for con-
sumption. For risk-neutral, quasi-hyperbolic discounters this implies that the entire loan proceeds
will be consumed immediately. This assumption simplies the analysis and highlights the tension
between credit rationing and the welfare costs of present bias. It is also applicable to the increas-
ingly prevalent consumption loans made by micronance institutions as well as consumption loans
(such as payday-loans and rent-to-own plans) common in developed nancial markets. In keeping
with the stated goals of many micronance institutions, we also consider the possibility that loan
proceeds are used to fund investment.
First, consider the case where the borrower has the opportunity to make an indivisible invest-
ment of xed size k. If both loan types are su¢ cient to fund the investment (L
1
; L
2  k), then
all excess proceeds, L
n   k, will be consumed immediately. The calculations for U and W are
unchanged, and the analysis of relative welfare proceeds as above. Similarly, if neither repayment
structure can support a loan su¢ cient to fund the investment, all proceeds will be consumed.
Alternatively, it is possible that when Condition 1 holds L
1
< k  L2. In this case, the
alleviation of credit constraints can lead to potentially large welfare gains as any investment where
all returns are realized in the future and which is preferred by the decision maker is also welfare
improving. Note that in this discussion, we retain the assumption the borrowers per period income
w is su¢ cient to make any period loan payments and the repayment feasibility constraint never
binds.
3 Extensions to the Basic Model
This section considers three extensions to the basic model. First, we alter the punishment structure
by allowing the utility costs of non-payment to occur non only in a xed future period but also one
12
period after any default. Second, we augment the basic model to allow for per payment transaction
costs, which act as a counterweight to the advantages of small, frequent payments. Finally, we relax
the assumption of linear utility, showing that without access to savings, two-period repayment may
be preferred as an consumption smoothing device even for time-consistent borrowers; however,
with savings, time-consistent borrowers can duplicate the consumption stream of more frequent
repayment.
3.1 Alternative Punishment Structure
In this section, we consider an alternative punishment structure under which when a borrower
defaults she not only loses the continuation value in period 3 but is also subject to some punishment,
 , enacted one period after any default. The incentive compatibility constraint for the one-period
repayment is now determined by
w  M1 + V  w    , (7)
which implies
L  (V +  )
R2
 L1:
Because the immediate punishment for default and the lost continuation value happen contem-
poraneously, the punishment operates just as an increase in V .
For the two-period repayment, again it is the rst period constraint that binds. However, that
constraint is now determined by
w  M2 + (w  M2) + 2V  w + w    :
This implies
M2  
2 +  
(1 + )
;
which leads to
L  (R+ 1)
2
R2(1 + )

V +
 


 L2:
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Because the punishment is more proximate to the rst-period repayment decision, it has a larger
e¤ect than a similarly sized increase in V . This leads immediately to Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 If L2 > L1 for  = 0; then L2 > L1 for  > 0. Moreover, for any set of parameters
R, , , and V , there exists a  > 0 such that L2 > L1.
To see the intuition, think about the extreme case when V = 0. In the two-period loan, the
punishment,  , needs only to balance out the temptation to default on half of the repayment,
whereas in the single-period loan it needs to be su¢ cient to induce the individual to repay the full
amount.
3.2 Transaction Costs
This section considers the addition of per-payment transaction costs. As a useful thought exercise,
consider generalizing this model to multiple periods or rather dividing the loan period into pro-
gressively smaller segments. If smaller, more-frequent repayments relax the repayment incentive
compatibility constraint, in the limit the lender would want to collect a steady stream of payments
from the borrower. Transaction costs are the balancing force. As noted above, weekly collection
costs comprise the largest share of MFIs operating expenses and borrowers often report dissat-
isfaction with the demands of frequent meetings. We incorporate this feature by amending the
basic model such that each payment costs the borrower t, where t reects, for example, the cost of
attending group meetings. Alternatively, t could reect per meeting costs to the lender that are
charged as loan fees or embedded into interest.
Now, the borrowers incentive compatibility constraint in Period 2 is Mn + t  V . Thus, for
a one-period loan, the maximum incentive compatible loan size is
L1 =
V   t
R2
.
For the two-period loan, the borrowers incentive compatibility constraint in Period 1 is simply
 (M2 + t)  (M2 + t) + 2V  0, therefore
L2 =
R+ 1
R2
2V   t(1 + )
(1 + )
.
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The relative maximum loan size, L2   L1 is decreasing in t, reecting the intuition that variable
transaction costs are a greater burden for more frequent payments.9 This is formally stated as:
Proposition 5 If  < R(R+1) 1=, there exists an interior solution (t > 0) such that L2 < L1
8 t < t.
Intuitively, whatever the advantages of more frequent repayment, for su¢ ciently large trans-
action costs the burden outweighs the benet and a single-repayment loan is preferable. From a
policy perspective, this setup also allows calibration of the optimal repayment frequency.
3.3 Concave utility without savings
The core model builds on the assumption of linear utility with the possibility of present bias. In the
next two subsections, we examine the robustness of our results by relaxing linearity and eliminating
the possibility of present bias. We consider the e¤ects of loan repayment structure on a classical,
risk-averse exponential discounting consumer. This section demonstrates that in the absence of
savings, more frequent repayment can still relax the repayment incentive compatibility constraint.
However, as shown in section 3.4, when savings is possible, a rational individual can do at least
as well with a single-period repayment structure as she can duplicate the consumption stream of
required repayments herself.
Now consider an individual with a utility function u(c), where u() is a well-behaved twice
continuously di¤erentiable, strictly increasing, concave, and satises the Inada conditions. She
has standard, exponential preferences over time with periodic discount factor , and lives for four
periods, indexed by t 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g. At time t = 0; she decides whether or not to borrow an amount
L at a periodic gross interest rate R. If she borrows, she receives an income wt in each of the rst
three periods (t = 1; 2; 3). If she does not borrow, she receives some subsistence income whose
utility we normalize to zero. For simplicity, we will set w0 = 0 and w1 = w2 = w.
She is unable to save. One simple story behind this is, property rights are insecure and so she
lives a hand to mouth existence. Therefore, when she gets the loan in period t = 0, she immediately
9One might wonder if per meeting transaction costs themselves are decreasing in meeting frequency, reecting the
possiblity that credit o¢ cers and borrowers may have more to do if meeting are less frequent. However, Field and
Pande (2008) nd no evidence of this.
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consumes it.
We consider two potential repayment schedules.
3.3.1 Case 1: Single-Period Repayment
With a one-period loan her incentive-compatibility constraint at time t = 2 is
u(w  R2L) + V  u(w):
The following equation implicitly denes the maximum incentive-compatible one period loan size
L1 :
u(w)  u(w  R2L) = V:
Let u 1  f(:): Notice that f(:) is strictly increasing and convex given our assumptions about u(:):
Then we get:
L1 =
1
R2
ff(u(w))  f (u(w)  V )g :
3.3.2 Case 2: Two-Period Repayment
In this case, loan repayment is divided into two equal installments of LR2=(R + 1) due in periods
1 and 2. All other events and decisions are as in the single-period case. With a two-period loan
her incentive-compatibility constraint at time t = 2 is
u(w   R
2
R+ 1
L) + V  u(w):
Since the individual is better o¤, the higher is L , the constraint will bind at the optimum, and can
be rewritten as
u(w)  u(w   R
2
R+ 1
L) = V:
The rst-period ICC is
u(w   R
2
R+ 1
L) +

u(w   R
2
R+ 1
L) + 2V

 u(w) + u(w):
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The latter constraint will bind at the optimum and can be written as:
u(w)  u(w   R
2
R+ 1
L) =
2
1 + 
V:
As 1+ < 1, the rst-period ICC is tighter compared to the second-period one, and is therefore the
relevant one. The above equation therefore implicitly denes the maximum incentive-compatible
two period loan size L2: This can be written as:
L2 =
R+ 1
R2

f(u(w))  f

u(w)  
1 + 
V

:
3.3.3 Comparing L1 and L2
Proposition 6 For the case with no savings opportunities: (i) For R = 1 , L2 > L1:(ii) For R = 1
there exists 0 < ^0  ^1 < 1 such that for  < ^0, L2 < L1 and for  > ^1, L2 > L1:(iii) If
f 000(:)  0, then ^0 = ^1 = ^: (iv) There exists R^ 2 (1; 1 ) such that L2 = L1 for R = R^ , L2 > L1
for R > R^ ,and L2 < L1 for R < R^:
Proof :
(i). For R = 1 , L2 > L1:
Proof:. The relevant inequality to be proved is
1 + 


f(u(w))  f

u(w)  
1 + 
V

> f(u(w))  f (u(w)  V ) :
Let 1+ = : Then the above inequality can be written as
f(u(w))  f (u(w)  V ) >  ff(u(w))  f (u(w)  V )g
or,
(1  )f(u(w)) + f (u(w)  V ) > f (u(w)  V )
but this follows directly from the fact that f(:) is convex.
17
(ii). For R = 1 there exists 0 < ^0  ^1 < 1 such that for  < ^0, L2 < L1 and for  > ^1,
L2 > L1:
Let u(w)  V  A and u(w)  21+V  B: As noted before, A < B: We have:
@L1
@
=
1
R2
f 0(A)V
@L2
@
=
R+ 1
R2
f 0(B)
(2 + )
(1 + )2
V
@2L1
@2
=   1
R2
f 00(A)V 2
@2L2
@2
=
V (R+ 1)
R2

2
(1 + )3
f 0(B)  f 00(B)
2(2 + )2
(1 + )4
V

:
Also, L1 = L2 = 0 for  = 0: For  = 1, R = 1 = 1 and by Step 1, L2 > L1: Now, for  = 0,
@L2
@ = 0
and @
2L2
@2
> 0: Therefore, L2 reaches a local minimum at  = 0: In contrast, @L1@ > 0 and
@2L1
@2
< 0
for all  2 [0; 1]: By continuity, therefore, there exists ^0 and ^1 such that 0 < ^0  ^1 < 1 and for
 < ^0, L2 < L1 and for  > ^1, L2 > L1:
(iii). If f 000(:)  0, then ^0 = ^1 = ^:
In Step 2 in principle L2 and L1 can intersect several times. This will not be the case if L2
does not change curvature more than once. It is strictly convex at  = 0 and so, if we can nd
conditions for which @
3L2
@3
 0 then we have su¢ cient conditions for there to be a unique  = ^
such that for  < ^, L1 > L2 and for  > ^, L2 > L1: The sign of @
3L2
@3
depends on the sign of the
following expression:
2f 00(B)
(2 + )
(1 + )2
V   f 000(B)
3(2 + )3
(1 + )3
V 2   f 00(B)(2 + )
 
4 + 32 + 6

(1 + )2
V:
It is easy to verify that that the third term dominates the rst term and so the whole expression is
negative so long as f 000(B)  0:(For the CRRA utility function u(c) = c the condition translates
to   12).
(iv). There exists R^ 2 (1; 1 ) such that L2 = L1 for R = R^ , L2 > L1 for R > R^ ,and L2 < L1
for R < R^:
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The condition L2 > L1 is equivalent to
(R+ 1)

f(u(w))  f

u(w)  
1 + 
V

> ff(u(w))  f (u(w)  V )g :
Since the LHS is increasing in R and given Steps 1 and 2, for any  there exists a 1  R^ < 1
such that for R = R^, L2 = L1: The rest of the argument follows by monotonicity of the RHS with
respect to R immediately. 
3.4 Concave Utility with Savings
This section extends the preceding discussion of concave utility to allow for savings. The economic
environment is as above with one di¤erence. In each of the rst two periods, the borrower can
save (s0,s1) at periodic gross rate of . A natural lower bound is  = 1; however, values of  < 1
capture the notion that savings mechanism may be imperfect (e.g., storage of grain) and savings
may depreciate as well as grow. Similarly, a natural upper bound is  = R, but it is possible to
think of situations where  > R. The obvious focal case of  = R turns out to be analytically very
tractable and so we focus our attention there.
We consider the two potential repayment schedules.
3.4.1 Case 1: Single-Period Repayment
At time t = 0, she can borrow the loan L. If she borrows, she receives income of w. From this total
cash on hand of L+w she saves an amount s0 2 [0; L+w] and consumes the rest c0 = L+w  s0.
She begins period t = 1 with savings plus interest of s0 and receives income of w if she has
borrowed. From this amount she saves s1 and consumes the rest, c1 = s0 + w   s1.
At time t = 2, the total loan plus accrued interest, LR2, is to be repaid. She begins the period
with savings plus interest of s1 and receives income of w if she has borrowed. If she chooses to
repay the loan, she consumes c2 = s1 + w   LR2. If she chooses not to repay, she consumes
c2 = s1 + w.
In period t = 3, she receives a continuation utility of V is she repaid the loan and zero otherwise.
Figure 1 summarizes the timing of events and decisions for the single-period loan.
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t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3
•Borrow L
•Income w
•Save s0
•Consume c0
•Begin with
savings rs0
•Income w
•Savings s1
•Consume c1
•Begin with
savings rs1
•Income w
•Repay LR2 or not
•Consume c2
•Receive
continuation
value V if
repaid in t=2
Single-Period Loan
3.4.2 Case 2: Two-Period Repayment
In this case, loan repayment is divided into two equal installments of LR2=(R + 1) due in period
1 and 2. All other events and decisions are as in the single-period case. At time t = 0, she can
borrow the loan L. If she borrows, she receives income of w. From this total cash on hand of L+w
she saves an amount s0 2 [0; L+ w] and consumes the rest c0 = L+ w   s0.
She begins period t = 1 with savings plus interest of s0 and receives income of w if she has
borrowed. From this amount she can make the rst payment on the loan, LR2=(R + 1)  M2,
saves s1, and consumes the rest, c1 = s0 + w   LR2=(R + 1)   s1. If she chooses not to repay,
she consumes s0 + w   s1.
She begins period t = 2 with savings plus interest of s1 and receives income of w if she has
borrowed. If she chooses to repay the loan, she consumes c2 = s1 + w   LR2=(R + 1). If she
chooses not to repay, she consumes c2 = s1 + w.
In period t = 3, she receives a continuation utility of V is she repaid the loan in both period
1 and 2 and zero otherwise. Figure 2 summarizes the timing of events and decisions for the
two-period loan.
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t=0 t=1 t=2 t=3
•Borrow L
•Income w
•Save s0
•Consume c0
•Begin with
savings rs0
•Income w
•Savings s1
•Repay LR2 /(R+1)
or not
•Consume c1
•Begin with
savings rs1
•Income w
•Repay LR2 /(R+1)
or not
•Consume c2
•Receive
continuation
value V if
repaid in t=1
and t=2
Two-Period Loan
3.4.3 Solution
The ICC in period 2 is
u(s1 + w   LR2) + V  u(s1 + w). (8)
Without savings, this is the binding constraint. However, because the borrower has the ability
to reoptimize her savings in each period, we must look at her incentive compatibility constraint in
earlier periods as well. In period 1, her incentive compatibility constraint is
max
s1
fu(s0 + w   s1) + u(s1 + w   LR2) + 2V g  max
s1
fu(s0 + w   s1) + u(s1 + w)g.
This constraint is tighter than the constraint in period 2. To see this, note that when s1 is xed,
the period 1 ICC becomes
u(s0 + w   s1) + u(s1 + w   LR2) + 2V  u(s0 + w   s1) + u(s1 + w),
which collapses immediately to (8). Dene s1 = arg maxs1fu(s0 +w  s1) + u(s1 +w LR2) +
2V g, that is, the optimal savings choice in period 1 if the borrower were planning to repay the
loan. The necessary and su¢ cient condition for the period 1 ICC to be more restrictive than (8)
is
max
s1
fu(s0 + w   s1) + u(s1 + w)g > u(s0 + w   s1) + u(s1 + w).
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This is true for all L > 0, therefore the period 1 ICC is more restrictive. The same argument
extends to the period 0 ICC. Therefore the operative incentive compatibility constraint for loan
repayment is
U r1  max
s02S10
s12S11
U r1 (s0; s1)  max
s02[0;L+w]
s12[0;s0+w]
Ud(s0; s1)  Ud , (9)
where
U r1 (s0; s1) = u(L+ w   s0) + u(s0 + w   s1) + 2u(s1 + w   LR2) + 3V , and
Ud(s0; s1) = u(L+ w   s0) + u(s0 + w   s1) + 2u(s1 + w),
with S10 = [max

M1 w(1+)
2
; 0

; L+ w] and S11 = [max

M1 w
 ; 0

; s0 + w].
For the two-period loan, the incentive compatibility constraint is
U r2  max
s02S20
s12S21
U r2 (s0; s1)  Ud, (10)
where
U r2 (s0; s1) = u(L+ w   s0) + u(s0 + w  M2   s1) + 2u(s1 + w  M2) + 3V ,
with M2  LR2R+1 ; S20 = [max

(1+)(M2 w)
2
; 0

; L + w] and S21 = [max

M2 w
 ; 0

; s0 + w  M2].
Note that the lower bound on s0 is determined by the minimum amount of savings required such
that repayment is feasible in both periods 1 and 2.
3.4.4 Comparing maximum loan sizes
We begin by comparing the maximum incentive compatible loan sizes supported by both repayment
terms under the assumption that the incentive compatibility constraints bind, that is, under either
loan, individuals would like to borrow more but are unable to do so because repayment would no
longer be incentive compatible for a larger loan.10 Here we consider the case where  = R 2
10 [GF: I still havent been able to nd a nice solution, or really any solution, for when the ICC will bind. Ill
keep trying, but do you have any idea what we should do about this if I cannot?]
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[1; 1=]. With little structure on individualspreferences, closed-form solutions are not possible
but a revealed preference argument allows us to characterize relative repayment incentives. To
provide an analytical solution, we next solve the problem explicitly when preferences are described
by the CRRA utility function. Finally, we return to the general formulation and characterize the
region of the parameter space for which the incentive compatibility constraints are binding. This
is not merely a mathematical novelty but provides some guidance as to when repayment frequency
will a¤ect repayment behavior and when it will be overshadowed by other loan characteristics.
We can simplify the comparison of the maximum incentive compatible loans under both repay-
ment terms by noting that the right-hand sides of both incentive compatibility constraints, equa-
tions (9) and (10), are identical. They are simply the utility of not repaying and are independent of
repayment terms. Therefore, which repayment structure supports the larger incentive-compatible
loan will be determined by the utility obtained in the maximization problems with repayment for
each loan type, that is, the left-hand sides of each equation.
Individuals are generally indi¤erent between the single and two-installment loans. The prefer
the single-payment loan only when the repayment required in period 1 under the two-payment
loan exceeds their optimal savings under the single-payment loan. The customary intuition holds:
under the one-period loan, savings allows individuals to duplicate any cash ow stream possible
under the two-period loan, and under certain circumstances they nd the forced savingsof the
two-period loan too restrictive.
More formally, dene the feasible range of savings in period t (st) for the i installment loan with
repayment as Sit . For example, S
1
0 is the feasible savings set for period 0 under the one-period loan.
Dene the feasible range of consumption analogously as Cit . Thus, S
1
0 = [
M1 (1+)w
2
; L + w] and
S20 = [
(1+)M2 (1+)w
2
; L+w]. This implies that the feasible ranges of consumption in period 0 for
the one- and two-period loans are C10 = [0; Pw+(1 R2=2)L] and C20 = [0; Pw+

1  R2(1+)
2(1+R)

L],
where P  1+ 1+ 2. When  = R, both expressions collapse to [0; Pw] . Carrying these limits
forward, C11 = [0; L+(1+)w max(M1 w ; 0)] and C21 = [0; L+(1+)w M2 max(M2 w ; 0)].
In period 2, they are C12 = [0; L
2 + 2Pw LR2] and C22 = [L2 + 2Pw  1+1+RR2]. As in period
0, when  = R, the bounds on consumption in period 2 are identical.
If w < M2 (in terms of the exogenous parameters, w < 2V (1 + ) 1), borrowers must
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save in period 0 in order to repay the loan under either repayment structure and the feasible
ranges of consumption in period 1 are the same under both repayment terms. In this case,
the optimization problems are identical for both the one-period and two-period loans. Hence,
maxU r1 (s0; s1) = maxU
r
2 (s0; s1), the incentive compatibility constraints are identical, and L1 = L2:
If w  M2, then C21  C11 and the exibility of the single-period repayment structure will
make it preferable to the two-period loan whenever optimal period 1 savings under single-period
is less than M2. That is, borrowers will prefer the single-installment loan whenever the period 1
repayment requirement of the two-period repayment structure prevents them from consuming as
much as they would if unconstrained. This can be summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 If savings is possible at an interest rate  = R and w  M2, then L1  L2. If
w < M2, then L1 = L2.
The intuition of the preceding sections is informative. Even without present bias, when credit
markets are subject to multiple distortions from both enforcement problems and a lack of savings,
the structure of frequent repayment can serve as a proxy for savings and relax credit constraints.
However, when savings is possible, the rigidity of frequent repayment adds no additional value. If
more frequent repayment would increase utility, the borrower can do at least as well by replicating
these payment streams herself through savings.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a simple theory based on present bias to explain a prevalent and
poorly understood feature of micronance lending contracts: high-frequency repayment. For clas-
sically rational borrowers, the pervasiveness of high-frequency repayment is theoretically puzzling.
They should prefer more exible repayment schedules. Less frequent repayment should increase
neither default nor delinquency. When borrowers are present biased, the repayment structure mat-
ters. We show that more frequent repayment can increase the maximum incentive compatible loan
size. This result supports the folk wisdom of many micronance institutions; however, the welfare
consequences are not clear cut. More frequent repayment can reduce welfare by facilitating the
over-borrowing that occurs due to time inconsistency.
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This paper also o¤ers a theoretical structure with which to interpret and extend existing empir-
ical evidence. For example, Field and Pandes (2008) randomized evaluation of repayment terms
for the clients of a typical, urban micronance institution in India found no e¤ect of repayment
frequency on default or delinquency. Repayment rates were nearly perfect for both groups. In the
context of our model, this suggests that the incentive compatibility constraints may not have been
binding for either group and is consistent with the relatively small loan sizes involved. Further
experiments, specically testing this and competing hypotheses, would help extend and generalize
our understanding of micronance contract design.
This paper considers the specic application of micronance, where the issue of repayment
frequency has particular policy salience. The core elements may also potentially be applied to
other contexts including mortgages, payday loans, rent-to-own services, and other consumer nance
products where frequent repayment is also a typical and salient feature.
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